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 1 
The Emotional Self: Embodiment, Reflexivity, and Emotion Regulation. 
Ian Burkitt 
 
Abstract 
Current dominant trends in the biological and psychological sciences tend to put 
emphasis on the role of the brain, cognition and consciousness in realising 
emotional states and attempting to regulate them. In this article I suggest an 
alternative approach with the idea that emotions emerge within social relations 
and give meaning and value to the situations in which we are located. Humans 
are understood as embodied emotional selves for who thought and emotion are 
intertwined. However, individuals can get caught in obsessive and compulsive 
thinking and feeling traps where the self loses touch with its emotions, and 
because of this also loses contact with the social situation and the ability to 
skilfully navigate it. In such circumstances the self gets overwhelmed by emotion 
and loses its poise in the social setting. I consider Buddhist meditation as a 
technique through which people can develop a more reflexive emotional self, 
where reflexivity is not about control of emotion but owning one’s feelings and 
being able to respond more sensitively and skilfully in various situations.  
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Introduction 
What is an emotion? Superficially this would seem to be an easy question to 
answer because everyone constantly experiences emotion in the course of 
everyday life. In the sciences, however, things are not so simple. The span of 
different theories and approaches to the emotions ranges from those 
neuroscientists who claim that emotions are brain functions that have evolved 
for their survival value (LeDoux, 1999), to sociologists and anthropologists who 
argue that emotions are social, cultural, and linguistic phenomena that vary over 
historical time and social location (Barbalet, 1998; Denzin, 1984; Lutz, 1988). As 
Stenner (2015) points out, the study of emotion in the Western sciences has 
been deeply affected by the philosophical settlement of the eighteenth century in 
which the mind was divided into three parts: first, cognition, which is associated 
with knowledge, thought, and intelligence; second, affectation, which is to do 
with feelings, passions, and emotions; and third, conation, associated with will, 
desire, and motivation to action. This was further complicated by the 
Enlightenment notion of the emotions as bodily and bestial, in contrast to 
rational thinking that was associated with the ‘mind’ and, thus, the realm of the 
human (Averill, 1996). A higher value was placed on rationality as this was 
thought to produce ordered and deliberate action whereas the emotions were 
the subjective source of irrationality and disorder, connected to the animal and 
the body. These ideological assumptions are deeply rooted in Western culture, to 
the extent that even though modern neuroscience is challenging the division 
between mind and body, cognition and emotion (Damasio, 1995), approaches in 
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psychology influenced by this trend still focus on the need for emotion regulation 
(Gross, 1998, 2014). 
My own approach explores the idea that emotions are both a bodily and 
cognitive phenomenon, while also attempting to put them back into a social 
context (Burkitt, 2014). This work is therefore located with the sociology of 
emotion but of a particular type, in that I have sought to develop the relational 
approach to emotions. That is, to claim that emotions are not discrete entities or 
‘things’, for they refer to patterns of relationship we are located within that 
provide the context in which our feelings and emotions make sense (Bateson, 
1973). As Gergen (1994) has illustrated with reference to domestic violence, the 
anger and hostility that existed between couples in his study were not felt by 
either of the parties before specific conflicts, but instead emerged through 
repetitive patterns of relationship whenever there was a dispute. What I want to 
do in this article is to develop the relational approach to emotion through both 
pragmatist and phenomenological theories to show how emotions are not 
‘things’ or measureable entities located only in the body or brain, but are 
experiences that emerge out of specific contexts in which we are related to other 
people and things in a meaningful way. Although emotions are associated with 
certain bodily feelings and with our reflexive consciousness of them as 
experiences we can verbalise and reflect on, these would not make sense without 
the specific relational context in which they have emerged. In terms of emotion 
regulation I will argue here that thoughts and feelings that get out of control are 
an issue for human selves, but it is often the attempt to control emotion that is 
the problem in the first place. Problems start to occur when the thinking and 
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feeling self loses touch with its emotions and they gain autonomy and control of 
our actions. First, though, I want to begin by outlining my ideas about emotion 
and its relational and embodied nature. 
 
The relational and embodied emotional self 
In my approach, then, feelings and emotions are to do with our relationships to 
other people and things within our lives, and to the various situations in which 
we are constantly located. In this sense they are indices that refer us to elements 
of situations and tell us something about their relevance and how they affect us. 
Thus, emotions always carry implicit or explicit meaning and value that is both 
social and personal. Emotions orient us in the world in which we act. This is 
connected to William James’s (1971) idea that the body acts as a sounding board 
in response to its various experiences, with feelings and emotions as its 
reverberations. There are few, if any, experiences and activities in life that are 
not accompanied by feelings and emotions, including the ‘coarser’ emotions such 
as fear, anger, and joy, or the more ‘subtle’ feelings like those of agreement and 
disagreement, pleasure and displeasure, as we read a book or an article. Feelings 
and emotions, then, not only make our lives meaningful by expressing the living 
engagement we have to the various situations we exist within, they are also acts 
of discernment that express our tastes and, as such, are markers of the things we 
like and dislike, love and hate. For James, this meant that emotions have to be 
understood in an aesthetic way, as acts through which we both understand our 
lives and make them meaningful. 
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James’s fellow pragmatist philosopher, John Dewey (1958, 1971), continued this 
trend of thought, seeing emotions as aesthetic acts, but understood that meaning 
comes before our experiences and structures them, because we act in a social 
world. He also fully realised that feelings and emotions are not only about 
discrimination, but more generally are acts of valuation. In feeling emotions such 
as love and hate, envy and jealousy, joy and repulsion, we are expressing the 
value of the thing (person, object, or situation) to which we are related and, thus, 
something of the quality of our relationship to it. In what has become a standard 
model in psychology, such valuations are characterized as ‘appraisal’ and seen as 
a cognitive – primarily mental – event in which people process information from 
the environment, assessing its relevance in terms of their own concerns and 
preparing us for action (Arnold, 1960; Frijda, 1986). For Dewey, though, feelings 
and emotions are not purely cognitive or psychological properties that we 
express in action, because they are the action itself; this means they are never 
solely bodily or mental phenomena, but always a combination of both. It also 
means that valuation is not first and foremost a cognitive process. As Brian 
Parkinson (2007) has pointed out, emotion can emerge from a person’s bodily 
orientation to a situation and from direct adjustments to relational dynamics 
going on within it: for example, the appearance of a gunman in a bank would be 
directly perceived as scary without us having to think about it first. 
As such, the aesthetic approach to emotion of James and Dewey attempts to unite 
body and mind, thought and feeling, as one irreducible whole that only ever 
appears in meaningful social action. From an individual, biographical point of 
view, the acts of valuing certain people or things form dispositions that are 
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central to the identity of the person, creating tendencies to act or respond in 
particular ways in given social situations. An emotional disposition is an 
adjustment of formed habits from the past to the situation in which we must 
orient ourselves in any given present moment. We all recognise such emotional 
dispositions in ourselves and the people we know as a tendency – that is never 
totally predictable or inevitable – to respond emotionally in particular ways to 
certain situations, and how this forms part of their character or personality. We 
understand our own dispositions (sometimes in a limited way) and those of 
others as a tendency to be bad tempered or good-natured, generous or mean, 
open or defensive, and so on, this being the basis of the emotional self. 
However, because humans are a social species that live in a cultural and 
linguistic world, this has already been meaningfully, actively structured as an 
articulable field in which we can express our feelings, before we enter it as 
individuals in infancy. Very young, pre-linguistic infants first encounter 
structured social activity as non-verbal meaning in relation to caregivers, who 
communicate through touch, gestures (such as smiling), and sound (like cooing 
or other communicative noises that are intended to sooth or stimulate infants). It 
is through the structures of non-verbal communication and the routines of 
everyday life that pre-linguistic children gradually begin to learn the meaning of 
words and to express themselves in language, thereby being inducted into the 
discursive social world. However, the fact that the world is already meaningfully 
structured by our own particular culture before we enter it as individuals does 
not imply that feelings are always transparent to us and that we can immediately 
articulate what we feel. This would account for those occasions when we 
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struggle to understand a situation and clarify our feelings with respect to it. 
Rather, it means that the world we are located in is already structured for 
articulation, even if expressing certain things in an intelligible linguistic form is a 
struggle. As Heidegger points out, when expressing something for the first time 
‘this is possible only in that it lies before us as something expressible’ (1962, p. 
190). Furthermore, we learn language in a practical and bodily way as speech, 
which is ‘a certain use of my phonatory apparatus and a certain modulation of 
my body as being in the world’ (Merleau-Ponty, 2012, p. 425), and thus speech 
shapes and moulds the very nature of feeling and emotion itself, the way in 
which it is pre-formed for expression. Feeling and emotion, then, are not things 
that exist in a pre-linguistic field and have to be expressed in language: they are 
already within the field of linguistic articulation but need interpretation and 
expression.  
Our feelings, then, orient us in the world, to objects and to others, but need 
articulating: what am I feeling, what is the feeling about, what is it telling me 
about my relation to a particular person, thing, or situation? In doing this, we are 
articulating not just a self-contained feeling inside our bodies, but are also 
interpreting what it is telling us about our relation to the world we are in and 
how it is orienting us within it. Fully articulating a feeling or emotion means 
locating our self in the world and articulating (or not, as the case may be) that 
orientation to objects, to others, and to ends or goals. This means, though, that 
for pragmatist and phenomenological thinkers, like those I have been referring 
to here, intentional and emotional action emerges prior to conscious reflection 
on the world or upon our actions within it (Gier, 1976). If and when we become 
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conscious of our actions and emotions, we do so when are already directed 
towards objects or others within our world. 
Thus, it is within relations and communicative interactions with others to whom 
we are directed that the emotional self is formed. This is true of the pre-linguistic 
child but is also true of the child as it learns language, and it remains so 
throughout our lives. The pragmatist thinkers have shown us that emotional 
responses are evaluations, but these are something we learn in communication 
with others (Cooley, 1983; Dewey, 1958; Mead, 1934). Whenever we act in the 
social world, others communicate their attitudes towards us; they say – in words 
or in looks and gestures – something about their evaluation of us or of our 
actions. Have we undertaken a task well or badly, have we acted in a moral or an 
immoral way? From the words, vocal intonations, and gestures of others we also 
intuit what they are thinking about us, how they may feel about us, and this in 
turn makes us feel something about our self. Are people responding to me in a 
good or a bad way, what is this telling me about my self or my actions? This may 
confirm dispositions and a self-image we have already developed – ‘I’m seen as a 
bad person, I am bad, I’ll show them how bad I can be’ – or it may run counter to 
how we see ourselves and want to be seen – ‘they think I’ve done something 
wrong, but I’m a good person, I need to make amends.’ Nevertheless, it is in this 
way that consciousness of self and the creation of self-image emerges out of the 
fabric of our social interactions. 
In addition to this, we also constantly experience evaluations of certain feelings 
and emotions, meaning that we have feelings about our feelings and what that 
means for us as a self. We feel a certain way about particular emotions, such as 
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fear of being afraid or of confronting difficult feelings in self and others, like 
bereavement. This includes the fear and apprehension we feel about unpleasant 
things and feelings, which are pushed away or denied. Such instances occur not 
so much in accordance with ‘feeling rules’ (Hochschild, 1983) as according 
norms that are communicated through interpersonal interactions, which are 
variable across time and place according to local cultures. For individuals, such 
interactions can create ambivalent feelings, feelings about feelings, that they are 
afraid or ashamed of having. This leads to some of the feelings being pushed 
away or hidden but they can then become overwhelming. In this way, emotion 
regulation occurs not just in instances where people apply feeling rules or 
normative demands to their emotions, but in interpersonal situations where 
ambivalent feelings occur because there are contradictory emotional demands 
placed upon the person (Burkitt, 2017). 
Later in life the judgements we make about ourselves, and about what we feel, 
are not always made from the standpoint of particular others, but from that of an 
impersonal position on our self and others. These are the moral or ideological 
positions we have adopted that reflect the values of groups with whom we 
identify, whether these are religious, political, or ethical views. It is through 
these positions that we judge and value our selves, our actions, feelings and 
emotions. This leads to what some have called ‘second order emotion’ (Archer, 
2000) or the appraisal of emotion itself (Gross, 2014), something that for Gross 
leads to emotional regulation. So for example, sexual desire for another person 
may be exciting and delirious if we are free and single, but dangerous and 
unwanted if we are already committed to someone and we value monogamy and 
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loyalty. For Gross, this would be one of the occasions for emotion regulation as 
we downplay our attraction to someone else and play up our attraction and 
commitment to our partner. However, for him, this is a cognitive act that is 
purely psychological. And for Archer the process of ordering our concerns, 
through which second order emotions arise in accordance with the hierarchy of 
our values, happens through an internal conversation that is understood as 
primarily a first-person process. In both of these positions, our relation to others 
and our identification with them is downplayed, in terms of the very creation of 
our acts of valuation in the first place. What I am saying here is that we evaluate 
our actions not solely through psychological, cognitive acts of appraisal and 
reappraisal, or through an internal conversation held only with our own self: 
instead, we take positions from many other stances, both personal and 
impersonal, as we reflect on our feelings and emotions. In this way, the internal 
conversation is of vital importance as we reflect on our feelings and emotions, 
valuing and judging them as we do so: but this inner dialogue takes place with 
more voices than that of our own self, both in communicative interactions with 
others and in the internal conversation, creating an order of concerns that has 
not been completely self-erected.  
The key point here, though, is that although feelings and emotions are 
themselves evaluations that develop through interactions with others and can 
become embodied as dispositions, we also make evaluations about our feeling 
and emotions that become second order feelings. This is done through 
reflexivity, which is any process that turns back on itself and becomes aware of 
itself: this can occur through conscious, cognitive reflection on an emotion, as 
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Gross suggested above, or as Archer noted through the internal conversation, as 
we evaluate emotions according to our values. In the next section I want to 
examine how this can, at times, lead to individuals losing touch with many 
feelings whose function it is to put us in contact with others and the world 
around us. The focus should not be upon the control or regulation of emotion, as 
Gross suggests, because this in itself can become a problem. Instead we should 
focus on how the self can be more present with its own feelings and deal with 
them in a more honest and open way. 
 
Being there: the emotional and reflexive self 
The key point I have been making so far is that feelings and emotions arise in 
relation to our world and, more particularly, to the people and things within it, 
and as such they tell us something about the nature and quality of our 
relationships. More specifically, emotions are themselves patterns of 
relationship, processes of embodied evaluation that tell us what or whom is of 
importance to us in the various situations that compose our lives. Along with the 
feelings we become aware of in social and communicative interactions, we also 
become aware of evaluations of emotion – that, for example, it is wrong in 
certain circumstances to feel angry, jealous, envious, or afraid. Attempting to 
block these emotions, to deny them or push them away, or to become fearful of 
them can lead to more problems than the emotions themselves. For example, 
panic attacks can be reactions to situations where we fear the rise of fear itself, a 
response that makes us lose control over our own self and our situation. Fear of 
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examinations illustrates this well, as it is not just the examination we fear but 
also the way we have responded to this situation in the past and how it has 
overwhelmed us. Buytendijk (1974) argues that when a situation overwhelms 
the self we lose our poise, which is to say we lose the sense of skilful command 
and control of it. Another example is embarrassment, where we feel as though 
we lose ease and grace in a social situation and form a heightened awareness of 
our awkward and distressed self, believing that all others who are present have 
seen this and are looking at us. The effects of this, such as blushing and 
clumsiness, can become greater objects of fear than the social situations that 
bring them on. To be poised, then, is to be self-possessed in that we remain in 
touch with our self, our feelings, and our circumstances, maintaining a degree of 
control over them. To lose poise is to lose this self-possession, along with one’s 
contact with the situation and sense of control over it, and to feel thrown off 
balance. 
This is something noted by Heidegger (1962), who says that in fear we forget 
ourselves so that the situation we fear, when it is encountered, overwhelms us. It 
is like we are flooded or engulfed by fear to such an extent that the self is carried 
away and all we are left with is the fear itself. Heidegger contrasts this with 
anxiety, which is a kind of objectless fear; because of this, we lose touch with the 
world around us, which comes to feel as though it is alien and meaningless. In 
this state, the sense of self is heightened to the point where it feels unreal and 
without foundation in the world. In both cases, though, it is the place of the self 
in these experiences that is central, along with the contact between the self and 
its world, the core of which are feelings and emotions. 
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If this is the case, however, it means that dealing with our emotions and thoughts 
more effectively involves not simply better control or regulation of emotion, but 
instead developing a self that can be more in touch with its emotions and also, 
through them, with the situations that compose its life experience. An interesting 
case in point here is Michal Pagis’s studies of Buddhist (Vipassana) meditation 
and the emotional self. For Pagis (2009, 2012) the emotional self arises in a very 
similar way to how I have described it here, through embodied social 
interactions. Indeed, meditation itself is seen as a social practice, as this becomes 
a more intense experience when it takes place in a social space with others, even 
though there is no direct interaction involved. When people meditate, what they 
become aware of is their own embodied reflexivity about their feelings and 
emotions, some of which may not have been acknowledged before. In the 
Vipassana technique, the mediators are encouraged to concentrate fully on 
whatever it is they are feeling without trying to avoid any uneasiness or 
discomfort that the feelings and emotions may bring. Instead, they are asked to 
focus on all the varied qualities of the feeling no matter how distressing or 
unpleasant they may be. They also are asked to do this without trying to 
interpret these feelings in terms of looking for a cause for them. This is done not 
just to put the meditator in contact with their own emotional self, but so that 
meditators ‘start feeling themselves feeling the world’ (Pagis, 2012, p. 105).  
In this embodied self-reflexivity, Pagis argues, the meditators are encouraged to 
accept their feelings and not fight them or fear them, and that through this 
process people achieve a greater detachment from their emotions by simply 
observing them. At the same time they become more fully aware of feelings 
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because they are not pushing them away, suppressing or denying them. Although 
I agree with this, I would also want to add here that the interesting thing about 
this form of reflexivity, achieved through meditation, is that it is a form of 
reflection on feelings and emotions achieved without further judgement and 
second order emotions. It encourages people into ‘being there’ with their feelings 
and being open to what they are telling them about certain situations in their 
lives. Being open to feeling means that the self can then be there with its feelings, 
own them and respond to situations, rather than being overwhelmed by 
emotions. We are present with them, are one with them, and so can respond 
more openly to others about the way we feel, while also retaining our sense of 
self and poise in the situation. This is achieved by establishing a reflexive 
position within the self that is observational and non-judgemental. That does not 
mean that the self then ignores all social norms and rules and simply becomes 
the expression of whatever it is feeling. Rather, it means that the self is more 
present in order to make those decisions about what is right or wrong to say and 
do in certain situations, being more in touch with both itself and the social 
context, including its relational commitments to others. As one of Pagis’s 
respondents in her research said, ‘When a storm comes you do not let it 
overwhelm you’ (2009, p. 272). 
However, one area where I disagree with Pagis is in her view that reflexivity is 
mainly based on the internal conversation, which is discursively rather than 
bodily based. According to her, what happens in meditation is that the internal 
conversation is switched off and instead people achieve an embodied reflexivity 
based on an increased awareness of their sensations and feelings. Although I 
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agree with this up to a point, I hope to have shown earlier in this article that 
feeling and speech are intertwined from the very beginning, so that feelings are 
linked to language and open to articulation. Because of this it is not possible to 
achieve a purely embodied reflexivity in which one can monitor sensation and 
feeling without naming them or discursively interpreting them. This is because 
speech is learned as a bodily activity and we also learn early in childhood that 
bodily feelings and sensations have a verbal expression. This is not simply to 
cloak them in verbal labels, but instead feelings and sensations are actually 
shaped and formed by linguistic expression. Thought and feeling are, from that 
point onwards, always interconnected. The upshot of this is that just as we can 
get caught up in obsessive or repetitive internal conversations that we wish we 
could switch off, so too can we get caught up in ‘feeling traps’ (Cromby, 2015), 
such as paranoia, that can come to dominate our lives. Indeed, thought and 
feeling is intimately linked as the foundation of human consciousness, and as 
such our feelings can fuel our thoughts and vice versa. So in the condition of 
paranoia, we think and feel that others are controlling our actions, can even see 
into our thoughts, and so manipulate and plot everything that happens to us. 
Because Dewey thought that humans are body-minds, perhaps we should talk 
about feeling-thinking traps. 
It seems to me that the overall outcome of meditation practice is to achieve that 
kind of reflexivity on emotion where one can assume the standpoint of an 
observer, a form of ‘generalised other’ that G. H. Mead (1934) talked of, but 
without that being linked to a particular social or moral standpoint with its 
concomitant values and judgements. It is an impersonal stance in the fullest 
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sense of that term. This is different from emotion regulation with its focus on the 
cognitive appraisal and reappraisal of situations, ignoring the bodily self and its 
embedding in a social world. It also contrasts to certain approaches in 
psychoanalysis, such as that of Fonagy et al. (2002), who help those in analysis to 
reach a ‘mentalized affectivity’, which is a mature, self-reflective, agential state 
where they can experientially recognise, understand, and regulate emotion. 
Although the end state is very similar to what I am outlining here, once again the 
emphasis is placed on the cognitive through the attempt of Fonagy et al. to align 
psychoanalysis with information-processing models of consciousness and with 
the need for emotion to be regulated by cognition. 
What the Buddhist practice of meditation shows us is the essential link between 
the body and the mind, cognition and emotion, because the techniques it uses to 
calm and relax the body – usually sitting still and quiet for a period of time 
focusing on an internal sensation like breathing or feeling, or on an external 
object – also calms and concentrates the mind. And once a more focused and 
concentrated state of thinking is achieved that also helps to maintain a calmer 
and more centred sense of bodily self, present in the current situation and in 
touch with its feelings and circumstances. As the respondent in Pagis’s study 
said, we can then feel ourselves feeling the world. Although many Buddhist 
thinkers are opposed to the idea of a metaphysical self, a given and unchanging 
non-physical entity, they nevertheless constantly refer to a self based on ‘the 
facts of [human] reflexivity and individuality’ (Collins, 1982, p. 73). But the key 
thing meditation techniques show is the link between bodily and mental 
discipline, and how this allows individuals not to be controlled by thinking and 
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feeling traps but to be more reflexively in touch with and in charge of their own 
self, including thoughts and emotions. 
 
Conclusion 
To understand emotion, then, we need an appropriate theory of the embodied 
emotional self and the relational nature of feelings and emotions. I have explored 
this by developing ideas from pragmatism and phenomenology to show how 
feeling and emotion is always a part of embodied and intentional action, even 
before we are consciously aware of what we are feeling. This is because our 
actions and emotions are formed in a meaningful social world that pre-exists us 
and which is something that we come to self-reflexive consciousness within. 
Because feeling and emotion is such an integral part of our being in the world, 
connecting us in vital ways to objects, to others, and to our own self, losing touch 
with our feelings or blocking them out can mean that we lose our poise and 
sense of being in touch with the world. The example of meditation practice 
illustrates the vital importance of staying in touch with feeling in a non-
judgemental way, so that the focus is no longer purely on the regulation of 
emotion, as if emotion is something dangerous and a threat to order. Individuals 
are able to better navigate the world when their own self is fully present within 
it, in touch with its own thoughts and feelings but not overwhelmed by them, 
responding sensitively to the demands of each unique situation rather than being 
caught in thinking and feeling traps. A self more present with its feelings is a self 
more in tune with the, sometimes contradictory, demands of the social world. 
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